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Abstract—Quantum private information retrieval (QPIR) is
the problem to retrieve one of f classical files by downloading
quantum systems from non-communicating n servers each of
which contains the copy of f files, while the identity of the
retrieved file is unknown to each server. As an extension, we
consider the (n−1)-private QPIR that the identity of the retrieved
file is secret even if any n−1 servers collude, and derive the QPIR
capacity for this problem which is defined as the maximum rate of
the retrieved file size over the download size. For an even number
n of servers, we show that the capacity of the (n−1)-private QPIR
is 2/n, when we assume that there are preexisting entanglements
among the servers and require that no information of the non-
retrieved files is downloaded. We construct an (n − 1)-private
QPIR protocol of rate ⌈n/2⌉−1 and prove that the capacity is
upper bounded by 2/n. The (n − 1)-private QPIR capacity is
strictly greater than the classical counterpart.
I. INTRODUCTION
A private information retrieval (PIR) protocol is a protocol
that a user retrieves a file from servers without revealing the
identity of the retrieved file. Since it was first proposed by
the paper [1], it has been studied in classical settings [2]–
[6] and quantum settings [7]–[11]. Especially, in the last few
years of classical PIR (CPIR) studies, the PIR capacity has
been extensively studied, which is the maximum rate of the
retrieved file size over the download size when the file size
is arbitrarily large and the upload size, i.e., the total size of
queries, is negligible to the download size. The paper [12]
derived the CPIR capacity for the most trivial setting that each
server contains the replicated file set. Several CPIR capacities
have been derived (see Table I), e.g., the capacity when some
servers may collude [13] and the capacity when the file set
is coded and distributed to the servers [14]. Moreover, many
other papers [15]–[22] have studied the CPIR capacity and the
capacity-achieving protocols.
As a quantum extension of the CPIR capacity in [12],
the paper [23] proved that the quantum PIR (QPIR) capacity
is 1 for the replicated servers without collusion. The above
QPIR capacity is strictly greater than the classical counterpart.
However, it still needs to be clarified whether QPIRs in other
settings have advantages over the CPIR counterparts in the
sense of the PIR capacities. For instance, in the PIR for n
replicated servers where each server contains f files and any
t servers may collude (t-private PIR), the CPIR capacity is
(1− t/n)/(1−(t/n)f) [13] but the QPIR capacity is unknown.
TABLE I
CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM PIR CAPACITIES
Classical PIR Quantum PIR
Replicated servers
without collusion
1−1/n
1−(1/n)f
[12] 1 [23]
Replicated servers
with collusion
1− t/n
1− (t/n)f
[13]
2
n
†
Coded servers by
(n, k) MDS code
1− k/n
1− (k/n)f
[14] –
∗ n, f, and t: the number of servers, files, and colluding servers, respectively.
† This paper derives the capacity for any even number n and the number t =
n− 1.
In this paper, we prove the (n − 1)-private QPIR capacity
is 2/n for any even number n. For any positive number n, we
construct a sequence of (n−1)-private QPIR protocols with the
rate ⌈n/2⌉−1, no error, and the perfect secrecy. We prove the
strong converse bound that the (n− 1)-private QPIR capacity
with the perfect secrecy is upper bounded by 2/n even if we
allow any asymptotic error probability less than 1. Since the
(n− 1)-private CPIR capacity for the infinite number of files
is 1/n, our QPIR capacity implies the quantum advantage in
PIR with colluding servers.
Our QPIR protocol is a generalization of the QPIR protocol
in [23]. The protocol in [23] extended the CPIR protocol
[1] by the idea of the superdense coding [24]. Similarly, our
protocol extends a (n − 1)-private CPIR protocol explained
below by the idea of the entanglement swapping [25]. The
CPIR protocol we extend is described as follows. Let (logm)-
bit files W1, . . . ,Wf be contained in each of n servers and
the queries Q1, . . . , Qn−1 be independently and uniformly
chosen from the power set 2{1,...,f}. To retrieve the K-th
file, the user prepares Qn which satisfies
⊕
n
t=1Qt = {K}
where
⊕
is the symmetric difference, and sends the queries
Q1, . . . , Qn to each server. For each t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the t-th
server returns Ht :=
∑
i∈Qt
Wi to the user, and the user can
retrieve WK =
∑n
t=1Ht. The protocol is private because the
collection of any n−1 variables in Q1, . . . , Qn is independent
of the query index K .
Our (n − 1)-private QPIR protocol has several remarkable
properties. First, the upload cost of our protocol is nf bits,
which is linear for the number n of servers and the number f
of files but independent of the file size m. Second, our protocol
guarantees the server secrecy, i.e., no file information other
than the retrieving one is transmitted to the user. Third, our
protocol requires the file size m = 22ℓ, i.e., 2ℓ bits, for any
positive integer ℓ, whereas the (n− 1)-private CPIR protocol
in [13] requires the file size m = qn
f
depending on n and f
for a sufficiently large prime power q.
In the same way as the paper [23], our QPIR protocol as-
sumes that the servers can share an arbitrary entanglement pre-
viously. A similar assumption on the preexisting entanglement
has also been given in the studies of the quantum interactive
proof (QIP) [26], [27]. The papers [26], [27] treated the QIP
problem that a computationally limited verifier requests some
computation task to multiple provers with quantum computers
and verifies the correctness of the computation result. Simi-
larly to our QPIR protocol, the QIP protocols in [26], [27]
assumed that the multiple provers share an entanglement but
do not communicate among themselves. On the other hand,
whereas the paper [26] (the paper [27]) assumed the two-way
quantum (classical) communication between the verifier and
each prover, our paper assumes the classical communication
for upload but the quantum communication for download.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
defines the QPIR protocol and presents our main theorems for
the (n− 1)-private QPIR capacity. Section III is preliminaries
for the protocol construction and Section IV constructs the
QPIR protocol with n− 1 colluding servers. Section V proves
the strong converse bound when the perfect server and user
secrecy is guaranteed.
Terms and Notations: For two sets A and B, define
A ⊕ B := (A\B) ∪ (B\A). The identity operator on any
space A is denoted by IA, or simply by I if there is no
confusion. For a state ρ on a composite system A⊗B, denote
the quantum mutual information between the systems A and
B by I(A;B)ρ. For states ρr on a system A which depend
on the value r of a random variable R, denote I(R;A)ρR :=
I(R;A)∑
r pr |r〉〈r|⊗ρr
.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we review the QPIR protocol given in the
paper [23], which is defined in the same way for the (n− 1)-
private QPIR except for the security parameters. Then, we
present two main theorems for the (n − 1)-private QPIR
capacity.
A. Description of QPIR Protocol
Let W1, . . . ,Wf be uniformly and independently distributed
in {0, . . . ,m − 1}. Each of non-communicating n servers
serv1, . . . , servn contains the replicated f-file set W :=
(W1, . . . ,Wf). In addition, each server servt contains a
quantum system A0t and the n servers share an arbitrary
entangled state ρprev on A01⊗ · · ·⊗A0n. The aim of the QPIR
protocol is that a user chooses a uniformly distributed query
index K ∈ {1, . . . , f} and retrieves the file WK from the
servers.
User
Query Index: K ∈ {1, . . . , f}
serv1
W1
W2
...
Wf
serv2
W1
W2
...
Wf
· · ·
servn
W1
W2
...
Wf
Shared Entanglement ρprev
WK ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
Colluding Servers
Q1
Q2 Qn
A1 A2 An
ρW,Q
A01 A02 A0n
Fig. 1. Quantum private information retrieval protocol with collusion of all
but one of servers. The set of colluding n − 1 servers (dash-dotted) can be
arbitrary.
For this purpose, the user and the servers perform the
following process. First, the user chooses a random variable
Ruser from a set Ruser and encodes the queries Q1, . . . , Qn
by the user encoder Encuser as follows:
Encuser(K,Ruser) = Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn) ∈ Q1 × · · · × Qn,
where Qt for any t ∈ {1, . . . , n} is a finite set for describing
possible query indexes to the server servt. Then, for any t ∈
{1, . . . , n}, each query Qt is sent to the server servt. After
receiving the query Qt, each server servt prepares a trace-
preserving and completely positive (TP-CP) map1 Λt from A0t
to At by the server encoder Encservt , i.e.,
Encservt(Qt,W ) = Λt
and the resultant state on A := A1⊗ . . .⊗An is
ρW,Q := Λ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Λn(ρprev) ∈ S(A1⊗ · · · ⊗ An).
Then, each server servt sends At to the user. The user finally
retrieves the querying file WK by the decoder Dec(K,Q)
defined as follows: Dec(K,Q) is the set {Yi | i ∈
{0, . . . ,m − 1}} of positive semidefinite matrices on A sat-
isfying
∑m−1
i=0 Yi ≤ IA which depends on the query index
K and the query Q. By applying the positive-operator val-
ued measurement (POVM) Dec(K,Q) ∪ {IA −
∑m−1
i=0 Yi}
where the POVM element IA −
∑m−1
i=0 Yi corresponds to the
decoding failure, the user takes the measurement outcome
WˆK ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} as the retrieval result, and WˆK = WK
holds with probability Tr ρW,QYWK .
Given the number n of servers and the number f of files, a
QPIR protocol is defined by the four-tuple
Φ
(m)
QPIR := (ρprev,Encuser,Encserv,Dec),
1 Server operations induced by Encserv may contain random operations
and measurements because TP-CP maps contain random operations and
measurements.
where Encserv := (Encserv1 , . . . ,Encservn). Note that the QPIR
protocol Φ(m)QPIR characterizes the above QPIR process. The
upload cost, download cost, and rate of the protocol Φ(m)QPIR
are defined by
U(Φ
(m)
QPIR) =
n∏
t=1
|Qt|, D(Φ(m)QPIR) = dim
n⊗
t=1
At,
R(Φ
(m)
QPIR) =
logm
logD(Φ
(m)
QPIR)
.
B. Security Parameters and Capacity for (n−1)-private QPIR
We define the security parameters and the capacity of the
(n− 1)-private QPIR when any n− 1 servers may collude to
reveal the identity K of the retrieved file WK .
1) Security Parameters: We have three security parame-
ters for a QPIR protocol with colluding servers: the error
parameter, the server secrecy parameter, and the user secrecy
parameter.
The error parameter α(Φ(m)QPIR) is defined by the smallest
real number such that
Perr(Φ
(m)
QPIR) := EW,K,Q(1− Tr ρW,QYWK ) ≤ α(Φ(m)QPIR),
where Perr(Φ
(m)
QPIR) is the average error probability of the
protocol.
The server and user secrecy parameters β(Φ(m)QPIR) and
γ(Φ
(m)
QPIR) are defined respectively as the smallest real num-
bers β and γ such that
I(Wi;A |K = k)ρW,Q ≤ β ∀i 6= k ∈ {1, . . . , f}, (1)
I(K;Q′t) ≤ γ ∀t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (2)
where Q′t is the collection of queries to all servers other than
servt.
2) (n−1)-private QPIR Capacity: The (n−1)-private QPIR
capacity is defined with the security and upload constraints.
For any α, β, γ, θ ≥ 0, the asymptotic and exact security-
constrained (n − 1)-private QPIR capacities are defined by
Cα,β,γ,θasymp := sup
{mℓ}
∞
ℓ=1,
{Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR}
∞
ℓ=1
{
lim inf
ℓ→∞
R(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR)
∣∣∣∣ lim sup
ℓ→∞
α(Φ
(mℓ)
QPIR) ≤ α, lim sup
ℓ→∞
β(Φ
(mℓ)
QPIR) ≤ β,
lim sup
ℓ→∞
γ(Φ
(mℓ)
QPIR) ≤ γ, lim sup
ℓ→∞
logU(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR)
logD(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR)
≤ θ
}
,
Cα,β,γ,θexact := sup
{mℓ}
∞
ℓ=1,
{Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR}
∞
ℓ=1
{
lim sup
ℓ→∞
R(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR)
∣∣∣∣ α(Φ(mℓ)QPIR) ≤ α, β(Φ(mℓ)QPIR) ≤ β, γ(Φ(mℓ)QPIR) ≤ γ, lim sup
ℓ→∞
logU(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR)
logD(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR)
≤ θ
}
,
where the supremum is taken for sequences {mℓ}∞ℓ=1 such
that limℓ→∞mℓ = ∞ and sequences {Ψ(mℓ)QPIR}∞ℓ=1 of QPIR
protocols.
C. Main Results
Two main theorems of the paper are as follows.
Theorem II.1. For the (n− 1)-private QPIR with any n ≥ 2
servers and f ≥ 2 files where the collection of any n − 1
servers may collude, there exists a QPIR protocol with the
rate ⌈n/2⌉−1, zero security parameters, nf-bit upload cost,
and 2ℓ-bit files for any integer ℓ ≥ 1.
Section IV constructs the protocol that achieves the perfor-
mance given in Theorem II.1. When n = 2, the protocol in
Section IV corresponds to the protocol in [23].
Theorem II.2 (Capacity of (n − 1)-private QPIR). For the
(n− 1)-private QPIR with any n ≥ 2 servers and f ≥ 2 files
where the collection of any n − 1 servers may collude, the
QPIR capacity is evaluated as
Cα,β,γ,θasymp ≥ Cα,β,γ,θexact ≥ C0,0,0,0exact ≥
⌈
n
2
⌉−1
, (3)
Cα,0,0,θasymp ≤
2
n
(4)
for any α ∈ [0, 1) and β, γ, θ ≥ 0.
The last inequality in (3) follows from Theorem II.1 and
the inequality (4) will be proved in Section V.
III. PRELIMINARIES FOR PROTOCOL CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we prepare two simple protocols to describe
our QPIR protocol.
A. Preliminaries on States, Operations, and Measurements
A qubit A is a two-dimensional Hilbert space spanned by
an orthonormal basis {|0〉, |1〉}. Define a maximally entangled
state |Φ〉 on two qubits A⊗A by
|Φ〉 := 1√
2
1∑
i=0
|i, i〉.
For any a, b ∈ Z2, define Pauli operations on A⊗A by
X :=
1∑
i=0
|i+ 1〉〈i|, Z :=
1∑
i=0
(−1)i|i〉〈i|, A(a, b) := XaZb.
These operations satisfy the relations
Z
b
X
a = (−1)abXaZb = (−1)abA(a, b), (5)
A(a1, b1)A(a2, b2) = (−1)b1a2A(a1 + a2, b1 + b2), (6)
A(a, b)† = (−1)abA(−a,−b). (7)
For any matrix T =
∑1
i,j=0 tij |i〉〈j| on A, we define the
vector |T〉 in A⊗A by
|T〉 :=
1∑
i,j=0
tij |i〉 ⊗ |j〉. (8)
With this notation, the maximally entangled state is written
as |Φ〉 = (1/√2)|I〉. Since T⊤ = ∑1i,j=0 tij |j〉〈i|, it holds
|T〉 = (T ⊗ I)|I〉 = (I ⊗ T⊤)|I〉. Moreover, for any unitaries
U,V on A,
(U⊗ V)|T〉 = |UTV⊤〉, (9)
(U⊗ U)|I〉 = |UU†〉 = |I〉. (10)
For the maximally entangled state |Φ〉 on A⊗A, the Pauli
operation A(a, b) on the first (second) qubit can be translated
to the operation A(−a,−b) on the second (first) qubit because
(I⊗ A(a, b))|Φ〉 = (A(a, b)⊤ ⊗ I)|Φ〉
= ((A(a, b)† ⊗ I)|Φ〉 = (−1)ab(A(−a,−b)⊗ I)|Φ〉. (11)
The following proposition is a case of [23, Proposition III.1]
for qubits.
Proposition III.1. The set{
(I⊗ A(a, b))|Φ〉 = 1√
2
1∑
r=0
(−1)rb|r, r + a〉
∣∣∣∣∣ a, b ∈ Z2
}
is an orthonormal basis of A⊗A.
From Proposition III.1, we can define the PVM
MZ22
:= {M(a,b) = (I⊗ A(a, b))|Φ〉 | a, b ∈ Z2}. (12)
B. Quantum Teleportation with an Operation
First, we give a modified version of the quantum telepor-
tation protocol [25], where an operation A(c, d) is performed
on A3 before the quantum teleportation protocol starts.
Protocol III.1. Suppose that Alice possesses two qubits A1
and A2, Bob possesses a qubit A3. The state on A1 is ρ and
Alice and Bob share |Φ〉 ∈ A2⊗A3. Quantum teleportation
protocol with an operation is given as follows.
Step 0 Bob applies the unitary operation A(c, d) on A3.
Step 1 Alice applies PVM MZ22 on A1⊗A2 and sends the
measurement outcome (a, b) to Bob.
Step 2 Bob applies the unitary A(−a, b) on A3.
The resultant state onA3 is A(c, d)ρA(c, d)† and it preserves
the entanglement. Note that Protocol III.1 requires two-bit
transmission from Alice to Bob. The protocol without Step
0 in Protocol III.1 is the quantum teleportation protocol [25].
A0
Reference
A1
Alice
A2 A3
Bob
|y〉 |Φ〉
A(c, d)
MZ22
7→ (a, b)
A0 A3
(I⊗ A(c, d)A(a,−b))|y〉
Apply A(−a, b) on A3
A0 A3
(−1)ab+bc−ab(I⊗ A(c, d))|y〉
Fig. 2. Change of states in the quantum teleportation protocol with an
operation A(c, d) on A3 (Protocol III.1). The symbol MZ22
7→ (a, b) implies
that the PVM M
Z22
is applied on A1⊗A2 and the measurement outcome is
(a, b) ∈ Z22.
1) Analysis of Protocol III.1: We show that the resultant
state on A3 is A(c, d)ρA(c, d)† and it preserves the entangle-
ment (see Fig. 2).
Let A0 be a qubit and |y〉 =
∑1
i,j=0 yij |i, j〉 ∈ A0⊗A1
be a purification of the state ρ. Before the protocol starts, the
state on A0⊗A1⊗A2⊗A3 is
|z〉 := 1√
2
1∑
i,j,r=0
yij |i, j, r, r〉. (13)
If the measurement outcome is (a, b) in Step 1, the state on
A0⊗A3 at the end of Step 1 is
2 · (IA0 ⊗ 〈Φ|(IA1 ⊗ A(a, b))† ⊗ A(c, d))|z〉 (14)
=
1∑
i,j=0
yij(−1)−jb+(j+a)d|i, j + a+ c〉
= (−1)ad
1∑
i,j=0
yij(−1)−j(b−d)|i, j + a+ c〉
= (−1)ad(IA0 ⊗ A(a+ c,−b+ d))|y〉
= (IA0 ⊗ A(c, d)A(a,−b))|y〉, (15)
where the multiplicand 2 in (14) is the normalizing multipli-
cand. At the end of Step 2, the state on A0⊗A3 is
(−1)ad+bc−ab(IA0 ⊗ A(c, d))|y〉, (16)
which is an identical state to (IA0⊗A(c, d))|y〉. Therefore, the
resultant state on A3 is A(c, d)ρA(c, d)† and it preserves the
entanglement.
Remark III.1. Even in case that the order of Step 0 and Step
1 is reversed, the state before and after the operation A(−a, b)
is identical to (15) and (16).
C. Two-Sum Transmission Protocol
Consider there are three parties Alice, Bob, and Carol.
By the following protocol, Carol receives the sum of Alice’s
information (a, b) ∈ Z22 and Bob’s information (c, d) ∈ Z22.
Protocol III.2. Suppose that Alice and Bob possess qubits A1
and A2, respectively, and share |Φ〉 ∈ A1⊗A2. The two-sum
transmission protocol is given as follows.
Step 1 Alice and Bob apply A(−a,−b) on A1 and A(c, d) on
A2, respectively.
Step 2 Alice and Bob send the quantum systems A1 and A2
to Carol, respectively.
Step 3 Carol performs the PVM MZ2
ℓ
and obtains the mea-
surement outcome (e, f) as the protocol output.
In Protocol III.2, the output (e, f) is (a+c, b+d), which can
be proved trivially from (6) and (11). The protocol requires
two-qubit transmission each from Alice and Bob.
IV. QPIR PROTOCOL WITH n− 1 COLLUDING SERVERS
In this section, we propose a QPIR protocol that achieves
the performance given in Theorem II.1 for any n ≥ 2 servers.
Assume that each server contains the following file set.
Given two arbitrary integers ℓ ≥ 1 and f ≥ 2, the file
set is given by the collection of 2ℓ-bit files W1, . . . ,Wf ∈
Z
2ℓ
2 and Wi for any i ∈ {1, . . . , f} is denoted by Wi =
(W
(1)
i , . . . ,W
(ℓ)
i ) ∈ (Z22)×ℓ.
Section IV-A presents our (n − 1)-private QPIR protocol
with three servers (n = 3) and ℓ = 1 as the simplest case.
Then, by using Protocol III.2 and the idea of the protocol in
Section IV-A, Section IV-B presents our protocol for any n
servers and any ℓ.
A. Construction of Protocol for n = 3 and ℓ = 1
1) Protocol: Our QPIR protocol for three servers each
containing the file set W1, . . . ,Wf ∈ Z22 is described as
follows (see Fig. 3).
Step 1 The servers serv1, serv2, serv3 possess one qubit
A1, four qubits AL2 , AR2 , AM2 , and AM22 , and one qubit
A3, respectively. The initial states on both of A1⊗AL2
and AR2 ⊗A3 are the maximally entangled state |Φ〉.
Step 2 Choose two sets Q1 and Q2 from the power set
2{1,...,f} independently and uniform randomly. Define
Q3 by
Q3 := Q1 ⊕Q2 ⊕ {K}.
For each t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the user sends the query Qt to
servt.
Step 3 For each t ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the server servt calculates
Ht :=
∑
i∈Qt
Wi. (17)
The server serv1 (serv3) applies A(−H1) to A1
(A(H3) to A3) and transmits A1 (A3) to the user.
A1
serv1
AL2
serv2
AR2 A3
serv3
A(−H1) A(H2) A(H3)
|Φ〉 |Φ〉
MZ22
7→ (a, b)
A1 A3
(−1)φ(I⊗ A((a,−b) +∑3t=1Ht))|Φ〉
Apply A(−a, b) on A3
A1 A3
(−1)φ′(I⊗ A(∑3t=1Ht))|Φ〉
Fig. 3. Two-private QPIR protocol for three servers and ℓ = 1. M
Z22
7→
(a, b) implies that the PVM M
Z22
is applied on AL2 ⊗A
R
2 and the measure-
ment outcome is (a, b) ∈ Z22. The values φ, φ
′ ∈ Z2 are determined by
(a, b), H1, H2, and H3.
The server serv2 applies A(H2) on A2, performs the
PVM MZ22 on A
L
2 ⊗AR2 , and transmits the measure-
ment outcome (a, b) ∈ Z22 to the user by sending
|(a, b)〉 ∈ AM2 ⊗AM22 .
Step 4 The user applies A(−a, b) on A3 and performs the
PVM MZ22 on A1⊗A3, and the output of the protocol
is the measurement outcome WˆK ∈ Z22.
2) Analysis: First, we show the correctness of the protocol.
Note that the application of A(−H1) and A(H2) corresponds
to Protocol III.2, and the remaining process corresponds to
Protocol III.1 for (c, d) := H3 and |y〉 := (A(−H1) ⊗
A(H2))|Φ〉 = (−1)φ0(I ⊗ A(H1 + H2))|Φ〉 where φ0 ∈ Z2
is determined depending on H1 and H2. Therefore, after the
operation A(−a, b) in Step 4, the resultant state on A1⊗A3
is
(−1)φ′
(
I⊗ A
(
3∑
t=1
Ht
))
|Φ〉,
where φ′ ∈ Z2 is determined by (a, b), H1, H2, and H3. Thus,
the measurement outcome in Step 4 is
∑3
t=1Ht =WK , which
implies the correctness of our protocol.
The user secrecy follows from the fact that any two of
H1, H2, H3 are independent of the query index K . The server
secrecy follows from the fact that the user’s information is
(WK , a, b) which is independent of any file except for WK .
The upload cost is nf = 3f bits because each of Q1, Q2, Q3
is written by f bits. The download cost is 4 qubits because A1,
AM2 , AM22 , andA3 are downloaded. The file size is 2ℓ = 2 bits.
Therefore, the QPIR rate is 2/(n+1) = 2/4 which is strictly
greater than the (n − 1)-private CPIR capacity 1/n = 1/3
A(p)1
serv1
A(−H(p)1 )
AL,(p)2
A(H
(p)
2 )
serv2
AR,(p)2
AM,(p)2
A(−G(p)2 )
MZ22
7→ G(p)2
AL,(p)3
A(H
(p)
3 )
serv3
AR,(p)3
AM,(p)3
A(G
(p)
3 )
MZ22
7→ G(p)3
A(p)4
serv4
A(H
(p)
4 )
User
|Φ〉 |Φ〉 |Φ〉
|Φ〉
Fig. 4. The download step of our (n− 1)-private QPIR protocol for four servers and any integer 1 ≤ p ≤ ℓ. For any t ∈ {2, 3}, M
Z22
7→ G
(p)
t implies that
the PVM M
Z22
is applied on A
L,(p)
t ⊗A
R,(p)
t and the measurement outcome is G
(p)
t ∈ Z
2
2. The snake shape arrow indicates the transmission of a qubit.
when any n− 1 servers may collude and the number of files
are infinite.
B. Construction of Protocol for n Servers
In this subsection, we present our protocol for any n ≥ 2
servers and any ℓ ≥ 1.
The idea of our protocol construction is described as fol-
lows. The number n of servers are generalized to be arbitrary
by using the idea of the three-server protocol in Section
IV-A. In this generalization, it is necessary for servers to
transmit the sum of measurement outcomes to the user, and
it is performed efficiently by using the two-sum transmission
protocol (Protocol III.2). The index ℓ is increased by using the
same query repetitively until the protocol retrieves the entire
file information.
Our protocol for n servers is described as follows (see Fig.
4).
1) Preparation: For each p ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, prepare the
following quantum systems and states.
The servers serv1 and servn have qubits A(p)1 and A(p)n ,
respectively. For each t ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, the server servt
has three qubits AL,(p)t , AR,(p)t , AM,(p)t . If n is odd, the server
servn−1 has AM2,(p)n−1 additionally.
The maximally entangled state |Φ〉 is shared between
each of (A1,AL,(p)2 ), (AR,(p)2 ,AL,(p)3 ), (AR,(p)3 ,AL,(p)4 ), . . . ,
(AR,(p)
n−2 ,AL,(p)n−1 ), (AR,(p)n−1 ,An) and (AM,(p)2j ,AM,(p)2j+1 ) for any
j ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊n/2⌋ − 1}.
2) Upload Step: Choose Q1, . . . , Qn−1 from the power set
2{1,...,f} independently and uniform randomly. Define Qn by
Qn :=
n−1⊕
t=1
Qt ⊕ {K}.
The user sends the query Qt to servt for each t ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
3) Download Step: For each t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, depending on
the query Qt, the server servt calculates
Ht = (H
(1)
t , . . . , H
(ℓ)
t )
:=
∑
i∈Qt
Wi = (
∑
i∈Qt
W
(1)
i , . . . ,
∑
i∈Qt
W
(ℓ)
i ). (18)
Then, for each p ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, the servers perform the
following process.
a) The server serv1 (servn) applies A(−H(p)1 ) to A1
(A(H(p)n ) to A(p)n ) and transmits A(p)1 (A(p)n ) to the user.
b) For each t ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, the server servt applies
A(H
(p)
t ) on AL,(p)t and performs the PVM MZ22 on
AL,(p)t ⊗AR,(p)t whose measurement outcome is denoted
by G(p)t = (g
(p)
t,1 , g
(p)
t,2 ) ∈ Z22.
c) For each j ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊n/2⌋ − 1}, the servers serv2j and
serv2j+1 transmit the sum G
(p)
2j +G
(p)
2j+1 to the user by the
two-sum transmission protocol (Protocol III.2) with qubits
AM,(p)2j and AM,(p)2j+1 .
d) If n is odd, servn−1 transmits |G(p)n−1〉 ∈ AM,(p)n−1 ⊗AM2,(p)n−1
to the user.
4) Retrieval Step: For each p ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, the user
performs the following process.
a) For any j ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊n/2⌋− 1}, the user receives the sum
G
(p)
2j +G
(p)
2j+1 by Download Step c). If n is odd, G
(p)
n−1 is
obtained from the state |G(p)
n−1〉.
b) The user applies A(−∑n−1t=2 g(p)t,1 ,∑n−1t=2 g(p)t,2 ) on A(p)n .
c) The user performs the PVM MZ22 on A
(p)
1 ⊗A(p)n whose
measurement outcome is denoted by Wˆ (p)K ∈ Z22.
The protocol output is WˆK = (Wˆ
(1)
K , . . . , Wˆ
(ℓ)
K ) ∈ (Z22)×ℓ.
C. Analysis of Protocol for n servers
1) Correctness: Let p be any element of {1, . . . , ℓ}. For
any t ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, define G˜(p)t := (g(p)t,1 ,−g(p)t,2 ) from the
measurement outcome G(p)t = (g
(p)
t,1 , g
(p)
t,2 ) of servt.
As shown in Appendix A, at the end of Download Step, the
state on A(p)1 ⊗A(p)n is
(−1)φ(p)n
(
I⊗ A
(
n∑
t=1
H
(p)
t +
n−1∑
t=2
G˜
(p)
t
))
|Φ〉, (19)
where φ(p)n ∈ Z2 is determined depending on H(p)1 , . . . , H(p)n ,
G
(p)
2 , . . . , G
(p)
n−1. Then, at the end of Retrieval Step b), the
state on A(p)1 ⊗A(p)n is
(−1)φ˜(p)n
(
I⊗ A
(
n∑
t=1
H
(p)
t
))
|Φ〉, (20)
where φ˜(p)n ∈ Z2 is determined depending on H(p)1 , . . . , H(p)n ,
G
(p)
2 , . . . , G
(p)
n−1. Thus, at Retrieval Step c), the measurement
outcome is Wˆ (p)K =
∑n
t=1H
(p)
t = W
(p)
K ∈ Z22, which implies
that our protocol correctly retrieves WK .
2) Secrecy: The user secrecy is obtained because the col-
lection of any n−1 variables in Q1, . . . , Qn is independent of
the query index K .
Consider the server secrecy. The user obtains WK and
G
(p)
2j + G
(p)
2j+1 for any j ∈ {1, . . . , ⌊n/2⌋ − 1} and any
p ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. If n is odd, the user obtains G(p)
n−1 additionally.
Note that before the measurement of the server servt for
any t ∈ {2, . . . , n − 1}, the state on AL,(p)t ⊗AR,(p)t is the
completely mixed state, which implies that the measurement
outcomes G(p)t for all t are mutually independent and indepen-
dent of any file. Therefore, the user obtains no file information
other than WK .
3) Costs and Rate: The upload cost is nf bits because each
of Q1, . . . , Qn is written by f bits. For each p ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ},
the user downloads A(p)1 , AM,(p)2 , . . . , AM,(p)n−1 , and A(p)n if
n is even, and downloads AM2,(p)
n−1 additionally if n is odd.
Therefore, the download cost is nℓ qubits when n is even, and
(n + 1)ℓ qubits when n is odd. The file size is 2ℓ bits, i.e.,
m = 22ℓ. Therefore, the QPIR rate is
R(Φ
(m)
QPIR) =

2ℓ
nℓ
=
2
n
if n is even
2ℓ
(n+ 1)ℓ
=
2
n+ 1
if n is odd.
(21)
Moreover, the sequence {Ψ(mℓ)QPIR}∞ℓ=1 of our protocols for
mℓ := 2
2ℓ achieves the negligible upload cost with respect
to the download cost, i.e.,
lim
ℓ→∞
nf
nℓ
= lim
ℓ→∞
nf
(n+ 1)ℓ
= 0.
V. CONVERSE
In this section, we prove the converse bound (4) for any
α ∈ [0, 1), θ ≥ 0.
For any t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, recall that Q′t is the collection
of queries to all servers other than servt. Let A′t be the
composite system of all servers other than servt and ρ′t|k
be the state on A′t after the server encoding. Let dt and d′t be
the dimensions of At and A′t, respectively.
We prepare the following lemma.
Lemma V.1. Assume that β(Φ
(m)
QPIR) = 0 and γ(Φ
(m)
QPIR) =
0. Then, the relation I(Wk;A′t)ρ′t|k = 0 holds for any k ∈
{1, . . . , f} after the application of the server encoder. That
is, the state on the system A′t does not depend on the file
information Wk.
Proof. Due to the condition (2), the uploaded information Q′t
is independent of K . Since the ρ′t|k is determined by Q
′
t,
we have ρ′t|k = ρ
′
t|i, which implies that I(Wi;A′t)ρ′t|k =
I(Wi;A′t)ρ′t|i for i 6= k ∈ {1, . . . , f}. Since server secrecy
(Eq.(1)) implies
I(Wi;A′t)ρ′t|k = 0 ∀i 6= k ∈ {1, . . . , f}, (22)
we have I(Wk;A′t)ρ′t|k = 0 for any k ∈ {1, . . . , f}.
The converse is proved as follows. Assume that
β(Φ
(m)
QPIR) = 0 and γ(Φ
(m)
QPIR) = 0. We consider the case
K = k. Let ρw,z be the quantum state on the composite system⊗n
i=1Ai, where w is the file to be retrieved and z := (wc, q)
for the collection wc of other f − 1 files and the collection q
of queries. The entire system A is given as a bipartite system
A = At⊗A′t. Since Lemma V.1 guarantees that the reduced
density ρw,z on A′t does not depend on w, we denote it by
ρz . Applying [28, (4.66)] to the choice σz = ρz ⊗ IAt/dt, we
have
(1− Perr(Ψ(m)QPIR))1+rmr ≤ EZ
1
m
m−1∑
w=0
Tr ρ1+rw,Zσ
−r
Z
= EZ
1
m
m−1∑
w=0
Tr ρ1+rw,Z
(
ρZ ⊗ IAt
dt
)−r
(23)
for any r ∈ (0, 1). Given z and w, consider the decomposition
ρw,z =
∑
x pw,z,x|ψw,z,x〉〈ψw,z,x|. Let σz,x be the reduced
density of |ψw,z,x〉〈ψw,z,x| onA′t, i.e., ρz =
∑
x pxσz,x. Then,
Tr ρ1+rw,z
(
ρz ⊗ IAt
dt
)−r
≤
∑
x
pxTr(|ψw,z,x〉〈ψw,z,x|)1+r
(
σz,x ⊗ IAt
dt
)−r
(24)
=
∑
x
pxTr |ψw,z,x〉〈ψw,z,x|
(
σz,x ⊗ IAt
dt
)−r
= drt
∑
x
pxTrσ
1−r
z,x ≤ d2rt , (25)
where (24) is obtained by applying the inequality
φ(−r|ρ||σ) := logTr ρ1+rσ−r ≥ φ(−r|κ(ρ)||κ(σ))
for any states ρ, σ, TP-CP map κ and r ∈ (0, 1) [28,
(5.53)] to the choice ρ :=
∑
x px|x〉〈x| ⊗ |ψw,z,x〉〈ψw,z,x|,
σ :=
∑
x px|x〉〈x|⊗(σz,x⊗ IAt/dt) on X ⊗A, and κ := TrX .
The last inequality in (25) can be shown as follows. Since
σz,x is a reduced state of a pure state in the bipartite system
A′t⊗At, the rank of σz,x is not greater than dimAt = dt,
which implies Trσ1−rz,x ≤ drt . Combining (23) and (25) for
any t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have
(1− Perr(Ψ(m)QPIR))1+rmr ≤ mint d
2r
t . (26)
For any sequence of QPIR protocols {Ψ(mℓ)QPIR}∞ℓ=1, if Ψ(mℓ)QPIR
has the QPIR rate greater than 2/n for any sufficiently large ℓ,
(D(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR))
2/n/mℓ goes to 0. Since (D(Ψ
(mℓ)
QPIR))
2/n/mℓ ≥
(mint dimAt)2/mℓ, the probability 1 − Perr(Ψ(mℓ)QPIR) ap-
proaches to 0, which implies (4).
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented the (n − 1)-private QPIR capacity for
even number n of servers when any n− 1 servers collude. We
constructed a QPIR protocol of rate ⌈n/2⌉−1, and proved that
n/2 is the strong converse bound with the perfect server and
user secrecy. Our protocol is carefully constructed by using
the quantum teleportation with an operation, and the two-sum
transmission protocol repetitively. The converse bound used
the fact that the state of any n − 1 servers is independent of
the retrieved file, which follows from the perfect secrecy of
the server and the user.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF EQ. (19)
Since the operations of different servers are applied on
different quantum systems, the order of the servers in applying
operations can be arbitrary. Therefore, in the following, we
consider that the servers serv1, . . . , servn apply the opera-
tions in order.
At the end of the operation of serv1, the state on
A(p)1 ⊗AL,(p)2 is
|y1〉 :=(A(−H(p)1 )⊗I)|Φ〉 =(−1)φ
(p)
1 (I⊗ A(H(p)1 ))|Φ〉, (27)
where φ(p)1 is determined depending on H
(p)
1 .
Suppose that at the end of the operations of servk for any
k ∈ {1, . . . , n− 2}, the state on A1⊗AL,(p)k+1 is
|yk〉 := (−1)φ
(p)
k
(
I⊗ A
(
k∑
t=1
H
(p)
t +
k∑
t=2
G˜
(p)
t
))
|Φ〉, (28)
where φ(p)k ∈ Z2 is determined depending on H(p)1 , . . . , H(p)k ,
G
(p)
2 , . . . , G
(p)
k . Note that the operations of servk+1 corre-
sponds to the steps 0 and 1 of Protocol III.1 for |y〉 := |yk〉,
(a, b) := G
(p)
k+1, and (c, d) := H
(p)
k+1. Therefore, after the
operations of servk+1, the state on A(p)1 ⊗AL,(p)k+2 is
|yk+1〉 := (−1)φ
(p)
k+1
(
I⊗A
(
k+1∑
t=1
H
(p)
t +
k+1∑
t=2
G˜
(p)
t
))
|Φ〉, (29)
where φ(p)k+1 ∈ Z2 is determined depending on H(p)1 , . . . ,
H
(p)
k+1, G
(p)
2 , . . . , G
(p)
k and the system AL,(p)k+2 denotes A(p)n if
k + 2 = n.
By the mathematical induction, the state on A(p)1 ⊗A(p)n
after the operations of servn−1 is
|yn−1〉 = (−1)φ
(p)
n−1
(
I⊗A
(
n−1∑
t=1
H
(p)
t +
n−1∑
t=2
G˜
(p)
t
))
|Φ〉, (30)
and after the operation of servn, the state is
(−1)φ(p)n
(
I⊗ A
(
n∑
t=1
H
(p)
t +
n−1∑
t=2
G˜
(p)
t
))
|Φ〉, (31)
where φ(p)n ∈ Z2 is determined depending on H(p)1 , . . . , H(p)n ,
G
(p)
2 , . . . , G
(p)
n−1. Thus, we have Eq. (19).
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